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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s a handful of state judges either held or opined 
in dicta what must be uncontrovertible to the feminist community, as 
well as to most progressive legal advocates and academics: the so-called 
marital rape exemption, whether statutory or common law in origin, 
constitutes a denial of a married woman's constitutional right to equal 
protection under the law.l Indeed, a more obvious denial of equal 
protection is difficult to imagine: the marital rape exemption denies 
married women protection against violent crime solely on the basis of 
gender and marital status. What possibly could be less rational than 
a statute that criminalizes sexual assault, and punishes it severely, 
unless the victim and assailant are married? What could be more 
obvious than the plain fact, repeatedly documented, that these state 
laws are derived from a sorry history of discriminatory, misogynist, 
*Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979, University of 
Maryland (Baltimore); J.S.M. 1982, Stanford University. 
1. See, e.g., Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Williams v. 
State, 494 So. 2d 819,830 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 
567, 573-76, 485 N. Y.S.2d 207, 213-16 (1984); People v. DeStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 163-64, 
170,467 N.Y.S.2d 506,515-16 (County Ct. 1983); Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775,778 (Wyo. 1987). 
45 
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and hateful denials of a married woman's legal right to equal dignity 
and respect? Where could one possibly find a sharper example of a 
state law that explicitly insulates and protects a separate political 
system of subordination and violence against a group of citizens, and 
thereby denies those citizens protection of the laws given others? So 
why has not the Supreme Court held as much? 
Indeed, that a number of feminist commentators2 and a few state 
court appellate judges3 felt it necessary to argue to a still skeptical 
and often hostile listening audience that marital rape exemptions con-
stitute a denial of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee that no state 
shall deny to any group of its citizens equal protection of its la~ 
evidences the degree to which women's injuries still are trivialized 
and rendered invisible by a pervasively misogynist legal, political, and 
social culture. That the arguments of these advocates met with such 
limited success in abolishing the exemption reveals how short a dis-
tance women have come, and how far we have yet to travel, toward 
full equality and the necessary result of equality: an assurance that 
the state will provide a modicum of safety in our private lives against 
sexual assault. 
Some states did make limited progress in reforming marital rape 
law during the 1980s. A few abolished the exemption entirely; - but 
only a few. The majority continue to permit rape or sexual assault 
within marriage by aceording it a lower level of criminality than ex-
tramarital rape of sexual assault, by criminalizing only certain kinds 
of marital rape, or by criminalizing only first-degree rapes. 6 Some 
2. See Freeman, But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who(m) Can You Rape?: The Marital 
Rape Exemption Re-Examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 29 (1981); Note, To Have and To Hold: The 
Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986) 
[hereinafter NOte, To Have urad To Hold]; Note, 24 J. FAM. L. 87, 87-93 (1985); Comment, 
For Better or for Worse: Marital Rape, 15 N. Ky. L. REV. 611, 631-34 (1988). 
3. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 163-64, 170, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573-76, 485 
N. Y.S.2d 207, 213-16 (1984) (opinion by Judge Wachtler advancing the most complete argument). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
5. For examples of judicial abolishment of the marital rape exemption, see supra note 1. 
For examples of legislative abolishment of the exemption, see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.443 
(repealed 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1989); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 251 (1983 & Supp. 1989); id. § 252 (repealed 1989); NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 28-319 to -320 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-20-01 to -03 (1985 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.355-.375 (1987); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1989). 
6. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 (1989) (criminalizing sexual assault of 
a spouse); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1988) (no arrest or prosecution unless spouse uses 
force or threat and violation is reported within 90 days, full exemption for lower degrees); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(b) (West 1985) (first degree rape only); HAW. REV. STAT. 
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states, ironically in the name of reform, may have worsened the prob-
lem of marital rape by extending the exemption to include women 
who rape their husbands in order to make the exemptions appear 
"gender neutral."7 This extension provides a false neutrality to an 
institution that almost invariably endangers only women's lives.8 Other 
states have limited the exemption to exclude married partners who 
live apart9 and, in a few cases, married partners who have begun 
§ 707-730-732 (Supp. 1989) (first through third degrees only); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Supp. 
1989) (only if force or threat of immediate bodily harm); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-18(c) 
(Smith-Hurd 1989) (rape must be reported within 30 days; criminal action only allowed if force 
used); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.2-.4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989) (first and second degree only); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3501.02, .17, .18 (1983) (husband can be charged with rape, but not 
sexual battery or aggravated sexual battery); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 27-464D (Repl. 
vol. 1987 & Supp. 1989) (husband can be charged with rape only if force used); MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West Supp. 1989) (no crime for lesser degrees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
609.349 (West 1987) (no crime for lesser degrees); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503 (1989) 
(husbands and cohabitants cannot be charged with sexual assault, can be charged with rape); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.373 (Michie Supp. 1989) (crime of "sexual assault of spouse" 
available only if force or threat present); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 (1986 & Supp. 
1989) (no crime for lesser degrees); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (no 
crime for lesser degrees); id. § 3126-27 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1-6 (1989) 
(husband cannot be charged with first degree rape; no crime for lesser degrees); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1.1 (1988) (spouse cannot be charged with rape unless spouses are no longer 
cohabitating or are legally separated, spouse uses force, and complaint is made within 90 days 
of the occurrence); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21-02(a), -12 (Vernon 1989) (husbands can be 
charged with only "aggravated sexual assault',); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (1988) (lO-day report-
ing requirement; spouse can be charged only with first and second degree rape); W. VA. CODE 
§ 61-8B-6 (1989) (first degree rape only; lesser penalty than nonmarital rape); Wyo. STAT. § 
6-2-307 (1989) (first and second degree only). 
7. Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-22-1.1 (1988) (recognizing spousal rape). 
8. See Note, supra note 2, at 1270-72. 
9. See, e.g., ·Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1989) (action only if petition filed 
for separation or divorce and parties living apart); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.41 (West 1986) 
(spouse cannot be charged unless parties living apart and offender knows that a temporary 
restraining order or injunction has been issued); MD. CRIM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 27-464D (RepL 
vol. 1989 & Supp. 1989) (if living together, actual force, rather than threat of force, required); 
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (Supp. 1989) (spouse cannot be charged for sexual battery unless 
parties living apart; statute silent on rape); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010.2 (Vernon Supp. 1989) 
(husband cannot be charged unless parties living apart, pursuant to legal separation or living 
apart where wife has received restraining order); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (1989) (husbands 
can be charged for rape, but not sexual assault unless parties living apart); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 30-9-10 to -11 (1984) (spouse cannot be charged unless couple is living apart or either spouse 
has filed for divorce); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (Supp. 1990) (spouse cannot be charged 
unless couple living apart petition for separation or divorce is pending or granted, and force is 
used); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (spouse cannot be charged unless couple 
living apart by court order); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1.1 (1988) (husband cannot 
be charged unless couple living apart); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-610 (1982) (spouse cannot be 
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dissolution proceedings. 10 These restrictions on the exemption, how-
ever, are a mixed blessing. While the restrictions undoubtedly limit 
the application of the exemption, they further entrench the core 
rationale of the exemption: the protection of the privacy and integrity 
of the true marital relationship against legal intervention justifies 
whatever burden forced sex imposes on a married woman's safety and 
privacy. Furthermore, movements in other states to extend the marital 
rape exemption offset these limits. For example, some states have 
extended the marital rape exemption to include cohabitants and for-
merly married persons. ll 
This pattern of one-step-forward, two-steps-back progress on the 
criminalization of marital rape illustrates the general pattern of think-
ing in the 1980s regarding marital rape. While virtually every progres-
sive commentator, judge, or legislator (feminist and otherwise) who 
seriously has considered the issue readily has concluded that these 
laws violate equal protection,12 and while explicit vocal support from 
conservatives for the exemption almost entirely has disappeared from 
scholarly literature,t3 no major upheaval of the law reflects or 
foreshadows such progressive unanimity. No congressional action, or 
any Supreme Court analogue to Brown v. Board of Education,t4 has 
enshrined in the country's fundamental law the political judgment that 
"equal protection of the law" minimally guarantees an equal protection 
from the states' criminal codes and enforcement agencies against vio-
lent sexual assault, regardless of marital status. In other words, no 
fundamental legal reform exists to bring these laws into line with 
what is perceived by eommentators to be a constitutional mandate. 
Thus, the change in soci.al consciousness that often follows constitution-
ally mandated legal reform has not come to fruition. Those who under-
charged unless couple living apart and one spouse has filed for separation or divorce); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (1989) (spouse cannot be charged unless couple living apart by court 
order). 
10. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1989) (action only if separated or filing for divorce). 
11. Many states include cohabitants within the scope of the marital rape exemption. See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a.-70(b) (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10 (1989); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon 1£183). 
12. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
13. But see Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 31, 43-44 
(1980) (limited spousal immunity supports marital privacy rights and encourages reconciliations); 
Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the 
Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 74 (1952) (policy of protecting reliance on behavior of 
others should prevail over the demand for protection of the woman's right to withhold consent). 
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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stand the exemption view it as an antiquated holdover from an earlier 
and discarded view of women.15 But the educated public, and even 
the legal community, lacks general awareness that these laws not only 
inflict extensive damage on innumerable women's lives, but also con-
stitute a constitutional outrage. 
Later in this essay, 16 I briefly will summarize and endorse the 
conclusion of the feminist writers and progressive courts that have 
considered the issue: the marital rape exemption unconstitutionally 
denies married women fourteenth amendment equal protection 
rights.17 That argument, however, is not the central concern of this 
paper. For the most part, I will assume, rather than argue, that a 
state's refusal to protect married women against violent sexual assault 
is unconstitutional. Instead, I want to use the marital rape laws and 
the movements directed toward their reform to raise two related issues 
about equal protection ideology and equality theory. The first issue 
is theoretical; the second is strategic. 
The theoretical issue is the following: Why is it that this overwhelm-
ingly obvious constitutional flaw in our criminal law has not, in the 
last ten years, attracted more attention, generated more outrage, and 
simply collapsed of its own unconstitutional weight? Why, after several 
decades of case law and academic commentary on the meaning, original 
intent, and political vision embodied in the equal protection guarantee 
of the fourteenth amendment, do we still have marital rape exemp-
tions, the express purpose of which is to deprive married women of 
the state's protection against rape? My argument will be that the 
endurance of marital rape exemptions, despite their apparent uncon-
stitutionality,18 partly results from the dominant understanding of the 
meaning of equality and constitutionally guaranteed equal protection. 
This understanding, particularly as elaborated by the present Supreme 
Court, obfuscates the unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions. 
No matter how unequal the laws are, given the current state of equal 
protection doctrine, no obvious, compelling argument sustains the con-
clusion that they are unconstitutional. Consequently, although an 
emerging consensus indicates that these laws surely must be uncon-
stitutional, no widely agreed-upon argument sustains that conclusion. 
15. See, e.g., Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 2, at 1270. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 95-10l. 
17. For the argument in detail, see Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 2, at 1267-72. 
18. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-54 (1972) (by providing dissimilar treatment 
for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, contraception statute violated 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment). 
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The difficulty in presenting a case that demonstrates the blatant un-
constitutionality of these laws, however, does not suggest that they 
are constitutional. Rather, it illustrates the inadequacies and am-
biguities in the equality theory within which equal protection argu-
ments must be framed. In other words, the endurance of marital rape 
exemptions partly is a function of the inadequacy of the dominant or 
mainstream political theory of equality, which informs dominant legal 
understandings of the constitutional mandate of equal protection. 19 
This much of the argument should not be surprising or unfamiliar 
to a feminist audience; feminist and progressive discontent with tradi-
tional equality theory and equal protection law reached an all-time 
high in the 1980s.2O The endurance of marital rape exemptions simply 
illustrates the inadequacies in modern equal protection law alleged by 
feminists and progressives over the last decade. More specifically, 
however, and perhaps more controversially, I will argue that the in-
adequate theories of equality and equal protection that we have in-
herited and that have muted the force of constitutional challenges to 
the marital rape exemption are not solely the product of the bad faith, 
sexist, racist, classist, or conservative politics of the Supreme Court 
Justices who authored those doctrines. They also are a product of the 
adjudicative institutional. context in which those theories have evolved. 
Mainstream views on the meaning of equality and equal protection 
respond not only to political biases, but also to the institutional con-
straints of their judicial origins. The Supreme Court, and therefore 
the rest of us, including the feminist community, generally have 
examined, developed, and debated the meaning of the fourteenth 
amendment equal protection guarantee in the particular context of 
judicial challenges to state classifications. This adjudicative context, 
I believe, has skewed and limited our understanding of equal protection 
and our understanding of how we should make the promise of equal 
protection a reality. MOl~e specifically, our confinement to the judicial 
forum has truncated a wide range of potential constitutional claims, 
including the particular elaim that marital rape exemptions violate the 
fourteenth amendment. 
This paper proposes not so much a novel approach to marital rape 
exemption or to the fourteenth amendment, but rather a new direction 
of progressive and feminist-informed constitutional arguments. I will 
urge that we should direct our arguments away from a hypothetical 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 69-93. 
20. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-37 
(1989); Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 201. 
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judicial audience and toward a congressional audience. If the dominant 
understandings of equal protection truly are inadequate, and if judi-
cially developed law has determined the content of those inadequate 
understandings, then "equal protection" might take on a very different 
and more helpful meaning if developed in a congressional, rather than 
a judicial, context. That very different meaning might highlight, rather 
than obfuscate, the unconstitutionality of the marital rape exemptions. 
Congress might respond more aggressively than the Court to the 
unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions, not only because of 
the different political compositions of the Court and Congress, but 
also because equal protection as a political principle guiding Congress 
might carry a broader meaning than does equal protection as a.legal 
principle binding the Court. 
Part II of this essay discusses three contrasting understandings of 
the meaning of equal protection: the Supreme Court's dominant ration-
ality approach; Professor MacKinnon's proposed dissident "antisubor-
dination" approach; and what I label the ''pure protection" understand-
ing, which may be closest to the original meaning of the clause.21 Part' 
III of this essay will then re-examine the constitutionality of marital 
rape exemptions in light of these competing views of the meaning of 
equal protection.22 The essay will posit that even if we accept the 
traditional, "rationality" model of equal protection, marital rape 
exemptions are unconstitutional. The arguments, however, are rela-
tively weak because of the content of the rationality model itself. 
Alternatively, if we understand equal protection in either the antisub-
ordinationist sense (that no state shall participate in the social sub or-
. dination of one group by another) or in the historical protectiqnist 
sense (that no state shall deny to any group of citizens the protection 
of its police power against criminal assault) then marital rape exemp-
tions clearly are unconstitutional. Judicial adherence to the rationality 
model of equal protection, consequently, obfuscates this unconstitu-
tionality and obstructs, or at least impedes, the abolition of these 
harmful exemptions. 
Part IV of this essay demonstrates that the dominant but in-
adequate rationality view of equality is largely a product of the ad-
judicative context in which that theory arose.23 In spite of the Supreme 
Court's rejection of them over the last few decades, the antisubor-
dinationist and protectionist equal protection theories, from time to 
21. See infra text accompanying notes 27-67. 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 69-93. 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101. 
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time, have been understood as the primary meaning of the clause. 
However, their collective mandate that no state shall perpetuate, en-
courage, or insulate the social subordination of one group of citizens 
by another by withholding from the subordinated group the protection 
of its law historically has been met through congressional, rather than 
judicial, action.24 Part V of this essay urges feminists, over the next 
decade, not only to cont.inue to press the Court to rule against these 
laws on the basis of their irrationality, but also to urge Congress to 
respond to the mandate of section five of the fourteenth amendment 
by undertaking consideration of a "Married Women's Privacy Act."25 
The purpose of the Act would be to guarantee all women the full 
protection of the states' laws against criminal assault. 
II. THREE THEORIES OF EQUALITY 
A. The Rationality Model 
The dominant judicial interpretation of the equal protection clause 
is that the clause generally seeks to ensure that legislators govern in 
a fair-handed and well-motivated way, rather than out of a malicious 
desire to hurt some groups or a biased desire to help others.26 Of 
course, all legislation unavoidably burdens some groups while helping 
others, but the Constitution requires the legislative allocation of those 
burdens and benefits to be directed toward legitimate governmental 
ends. Accordingly, legislation must be rational, or evenhanded: legis-
lation must not be the product of bias, malice, or differing levels of 
concern for some citizens over others. Rather, legislation and the 
classifications of legislation must be rationally related to legitimate 
state ends. In accord with general usage, I call this dominant view 
the rationality model of equal protection.2:1 
24. Examples include the Civil Rights Act of 1875, partially struck in The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a to 2000h-5 
(West 1982), upheld in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
25. See infra text accompanying note 105. 
26. For a general discussion, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-13 
to -17, at 1465-88 (1988). 
27. For general discussions of the rationality approach to equal protection, see J. ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 145-48 (1980); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-24 
(1972); Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1689, 1697-98, 1713-14 (1984); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 537, 569-77 (1982). 
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The rationality model, as it has developed doctrinally, imposes 
three easily summarized constraints upon legislative classifications.28 
First, as the name of the model implies, legislative classifications must 
be rational: ''like groups must be treated alike." Thus, a legislative 
classification that defines groups A and B, divides them, and then 
treats them differently must ''map on to" or ''mirror'' a distinction in 
the world between groups A and B that is relevant to some legitimate 
state objective. If no relevant difference between groups A and B 
exists, then legislation that treats them differently is irrational and 
unconstitutional because it denies the citizens in the burdened group 
equal protection of the laws. For example, if a statute prohibits minors 
under the age of sixteen from applying for driver's licenses, some 
''real world" difference must exist between those under and over six-
teen that correlates with some legitimate state objective. In other 
words, some correlation must exist between maturity and propensity 
to drive safely. If no such correlation exists, evidence of the irrational 
desire to burden young teenagers must have motivated the legislators 
rather than by a legitimate governmental aim. Because most of us 
generally accept the notion of a correlation between maturity and 
driving ability, the cut-off age seems to be constitutionally unassaila-
ble, at least on rationality grounds. 
The rationality model imposes a second constraint on classification. 
The legislative classification must be relevant to a legitimate end. If 
the classification furthers a legitimate state objective only marginally 
or not at all and imposes a significant cost on the burdened class, then 
the legislation might be unconstitutional. Applying this requirement 
to the driving statute and assuming that age correlates with driving 
ability, the exclusion-of those under sixteen from the driving population 
must further sufficiently the legitimate goal of driving safety in order 
to justify the burden placed on teenagers - the lack of mobility. 
Again, because most people would feel fairly confident that the exclu-
sion does improve driving safety and because we are not terribly 
concerned about obstacles to teenage mobility, the driving statute 
passes the relevance requirement just as it did the rationality require-
ment. 
Finally, the rationality model requires that the articulated legisla-
tive end be a legitimate one. Legislators may classify and differentially 
assist or burden certain groups, but only if they are doing so in the 
public interest or toward the vindication of some public value. 
28. For a detailed discussion of these constraints, see L. TRIBE, supra note 26, §§ 16-1 to 
-6, at 1438-54. 
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Moreover, the end toward which the classification is directed must be 
an end that legislators are permitted to pursue. Legislators may not 
classify for the malicious satisfaction of hurting one sector of the com-
munity while helping another. The driving statute survives this final 
test, for public safety surely is a legitimate legislative end. The statute, 
therefore, is not aimed at maliciously burdening young teenagers. 
These three basic principles of rationality, relevance, and legiti-
macy provide the foundation for modern equal protection jurispru-
dence. These three constraints motivated the Court to adopt various 
levels of "scrutiny" for different types of legislation. The rationality, 
relevance, and legitimacy requirements also explain the peculiarities 
of Supreme Court doctline regarding legislation that classifies on the 
basis of gender29 and the "intent" requirement that facially neutral 
legislation that adversely impacts upon a particular group must meet.3O 
A brief summary of these three doctrinal areas reveals the Court's 
general comlnitment to rationality. 
First, the logic of the Court's two-tiered, or heightened versus 
low-level, review more or less follows directly from rationality princi-
ples. Under the rationality, relevance, and legitimacy principles sum-
marized above, the Court has conceded that most econolnic or social 
legislation is presumptively rational, relevant to legitimate governmen-
tal ends, and, hence, constitutional.31 After all, relevance, rationality, 
and legitimacy, are all relative qualities, and the Court has developed 
a pattern of general deference to legislative judgment in the econolnic 
and social spheres. Classifications that involve race, however, are 
entirely another matter. The Court generally has held that most ra-
cially explicit classificati.ons are presumptively suspect, and, therefore, 
their rationality, their relevance, and their legitimacy must be strictly 
scrutinized.32 Such strict scrutiny typically has resulted in the invali-
dation of these statutes.33 Racial classifications presumptively fail to 
29. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement ofthose objectives"). 
30. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (statute must have a racially discrim-
inatory purpose to violate equal protection clause). 
31. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (several provisions of 
state statute governing opticians were rationally related to legitimate governmental ends and 
did not violate equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment). 
32. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 720-23 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (searching judicial inquiry required to deternline whether racial classifications are sus-
pect or benign); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (racial and ethnic 
distinctions are inherently suspect and require "exacting judicial examination"); Brown v. Board 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."). 
33. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1967) (strict scrutiny applied to determine 
that interracial marriage proscription statute constituted invidious racial discrimination). But 
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mirror a real distinction in the world between the classes they 
categorize and presumptively fail to further legitimate governmental 
ends. Hence, blacks and whites possess no inherent real differences, 
and the Court finds irrational legislative classifications that create 
differences between blacks and whites. Further, such classifications, 
whether rational or not, are relevant to no legitimate ends.34 Thus, 
the Court routinely engages in a heavy presumption that racial class-
ifications are not good-faith attempts to classify based on real world 
differences that are relevant to legitimate goals. Rather, the Court 
views these classifications as badly motivated attempts to burden al-
ready disadvantaged subordinate groups. 
The Court seems to believe that gender classifications fall some-
where between economic classifications (presumptively legitimate) and 
racial classifications (presumptively illegitimate). According to the 
Court, some biological and social ''real differences" between men and 
women do exist; consequently, some legislative classifications that dis-
tinguish men and women may be rational.35 Further, women have not 
been targeted as a class in the same way as blacks have, and, therefore, 
the Court does not as readily presume that gendered classifications 
are badly motivated.35 Unlike racial classifications, gender classifica-
tions are not necessarily irrational, and the ends toward which they 
aim are not necessarily illegitimate. Thus, the judicial scrutiny that 
the Court applies to gender classifications is higher than that which 
the Court applies to economic legislation, but not as strict as that 
which the Court applies to racial classifications. While the Court has 
struck down some gender-based statutes,37 it has upheld more than a 
few. 38 
see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944) (strict scrutiny applied, but act 
upheld as not constituting invidious racial discrimination). 
34. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 9-11 (classifications based solely on race have no legitimate 
purpose). 
35. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981) (gender classification requiring only 
men to register for draft, not invidious and not unconstitutional); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 
450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981) (plurality opinion) (California statute punishing only males for raping 
females does not unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of gender). 
36. This insight explains the Court's uncertainty over whether gender-based discriminations 
hurt or help women, or discriminate against men rather than women. See, e.g., Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam) (more lenient formula to calculate social security 
benefits for women than men); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1977) (Plurality 
opinion); id. at 217-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (gender-based difference between 
widow and widowers for social security benefits). 
37. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
38. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 
498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
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Finally, as the Court held in Washington v. Davis,39 legislation 
that does not facially discriminate between men and women or whites 
and blacks, but nevertheless adversely affects the interests of persons 
in those classes, is not, for that reason alone, unconstitutional. 40 
Rather, facially neutral legislation is unconstitutional only if the law-
making body intended its adverse impact. 41 This "intent" requirement 
with respect to fourteenth amendment challenges to race-neutral or 
gender-neutral legislation also can be derived from the Court's general 
commitment to rationali.ty as the goal of equal protection and irration-
ality as the targeted evil. Under the rationality model, a general rule 
applied to all equally will not be found irrational because the burden 
of the rule falls more heavily upon one group than upon another. 
Instead, a rule is irrational only if the rule treats similarly situated 
groups differently. Such rules will affect adversely some groups be-
cause of the differential situation of the burdened groups: the rule 
treats differently situated groups similarly rather than similarly 
situated groups differently. However, if irrationality means the differ-
ential treatment of similar groups, then even-handed treatment of 
different groups, regardless of its impact, is neither rational nor irra-
tional, but simply different. Furthermore, no obvious reason compels 
doubt of the authors' motives of such race-neutral or gender-neutral 
legislation or the legitimacy of the ends the offending legislation pur-
portedly serves. Thus, the Washington v. Davis holding could be re-
stated in this way: legislation that adversely injures blacks or women, 
but does so in spite of its facial evenhandedness, violates neither 
notions of "logical rationality" (that likes be treated alike) nor norms 
of "ethical rationality" (that legislation be nonmalicious in its origin 
and general in its societal impact). Therefore, for such legislation to 
violate fourteenth amendment norms, the challenger must show a 
specific legislative intent to harm. Absent a showing of specific intent, 
the Court will uphold a facially neutral statute as constitutional. 
B. The Attack on Pormal Equality and the Rationality Model 
The central judicial presumption of the rationality model, that racial 
classifications always are irrational and that gender classifications usu-
ally are irrational, rests on a theory of equality grounded in a univer-
salist vision of our shared human nature. That vision is unquestionably 
noble and appealing in its aspiration. Its guiding assumption is that 
39. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
40. See id. at 239, 242. 
41. See id. at 239-41. 
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all persons - women, men, blacks, and whites - are more or less the 
same with respect to the traits and issues that affect or should affect 
political decisionmaking.42 Women as well as men, and blacks as well 
as whites, wish to lead and can lead meaningful lives ennobled by 
participation in the shared, political life of the public sphere, enriched 
by fairly compensated and intrinsically rewarding work in the private 
sphere, and enlivened by stimulating, nurturant relationships in the 
intimate sphere. Blacks no less than whites, and women no less than 
men, benefit from the liberal arts and educational opportunities 
deepening intellectual adult life. Blacks and women, like whites and 
men, need and value opportunities to develop athletic potential. Many 
women, like many men, treasure and pursue the opportunity to enlist 
in the country's armed services and willingly devote their lives to 
strengthen the country's defense capabilities against outside aggres-
sion. Women, like men, and blacks, like whites, can be competent and 
fair jurors, estate executors, lawyers, and doctors. The list could be 
extended endlessly. Legislation that classifies on the basis of gender 
or race and that burdens women's or blacks' political, economic, ath-
letic, or educational opportunities in any sphere in which women and 
men and blacks and whites are similarly situated is irrational, and 
hence, unconstitutional. The universalist vision promotes this formal 
or legal ideal of equality and provides the basis for the rationality 
interpretation of the equal protection clause. In all areas of life in 
which blacks and whites and women and men are the same, the legis-
lator must treat them as the same. 
During the 1980s feminist legal theorists registered increasing dis-
satisfaction with the rationalist model of equal protection, the formal 
or legal vision of equality toward which it aspires, and the universalist 
conception of human nature in which it is rooted.43 Such feminist dis-
satisfaction with formal equality stems not so much from a suspicion 
that the Court's practice cannot live up to the promise of equal treat-
ment, but from the nature of the promise itself. Formal equality -
across-the-board equal treatment of women and men - would have 
42. The vision is also, in some of its fonns, unquestionably feminist. For a strong defense 
and explication of the virtues of the model from a feminist point of view, see Williams, Notes 
from a First Generation, 1989 Cm. LEGAL F. 99. 
43. In a recent article capturing both the spirit and the content of this critique, Professor 
Mary Becker provocatively dubbed the promise of formal equality inherent in the rationality 
model ''Prince Charming." See Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1989 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201 (arguing that formal equality would not help and often would hurt women's actual 
well-being). 
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only a limited effect on women's lives for two basic reasons. First, 
women and men are not similar, the universalist premises of the ration-
ality model notwithstanding. To summarize a great deal of recent 
feminist writings: women have different perceptions and experiences 
of the social world,44 different understandings or moral obligations,45 
different perspectives of the biological role in reproduction,46 different 
ways of assimilating knowledge,47 different feelings toward housework 
and childraising,48 different vulnerabilities toward different potential 
harms,49 different life patterns,50 and a radically different history. 51 
Insistence upon the "sameness" of men and women in the face of 
undeniable differences between them and social subordination of 
women by men enshrines male attributes as the "norm" and denies 
the existence and value of female attributes, pursuits, and ways of 
life. 52 Any constitutional standard based on the theory that men and 
women are the same will benefit only those women least in need of 
the law's protection - women, such as the "professional women" of 
the 1980s, who already are most like men. 53 Formal equality will ignore 
or even hurt those women "least" like men: traditional homemakers 
and women trapped in low-paying and gender-segregated jobs.54 Fi-
nally, formal equality is irrelevant to all women in those spheres of 
our lives in which we a.re most clearly unlike men: our more marked 
vulnerability to sexual assault, our greater involvement in childraising 
and housework, and our different role in the reproductive process. 
The rationality model fails because it rests on a false assumption of 
sameness and aspires toward a goal of similar treatment that will help 
only marginally a few already-privileged women. Its consequence will 
be not true equality but further harm to most women. 55 
44. See Fineman, Challenging Law, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25 (1990); West, TIw Difference 
in Women's Hedonic Lives, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987). 
45. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
46. S. FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION 
(1970). 
47. M. BELENKY, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, 
AND MIND (1986). 
48. A. HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION 
AT HOME (1989). 
49. West, supra note 44. 
50. T. OLSEN, SILENCES (1978). 
51. Id. 
52. See generally Littleton, Women's Experience, 1989 CHI. LEGAL F. 23; Note, Toward 
a Redefinition {)f Se=l Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487, 499 (1981). 
53. See generally C. MAcK.INNON, supra note 20, at 215-34 (critique of formal equality). 
54. See generally Becker, supra note 43 (critique of formal equality). 
55. See generally id. 
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This "sameness-difference" problem with the dominant rationality 
model has prompted several feminists, notably Christine Littleton, to 
advocate a modification or reform of the rationality doctrine itself. 56 
Littleton has argued that equality should mean not just treating groups 
the same when they are the same, but also treating them differently 
when they are different, and doing so in such a way as to ensure a 
rough equality of outcomes. 57 Under this modified view of the ration-
ality model of equality, which Littleton calls the equal acceptance 
model, the equal protection clause requires legislators to be "equally 
accepting" of men and women. 58 If women are the same as men in 
certain aspects, they should be treated similarly. But in aspects in 
which women and men differ, the law should be as equally responsive 
to men's and women's differing characteristics, attributes, needs, val-
ues, vulnerabilities, and aspirations. The impulse behind the "accep-
tance" picture of equality is strikingly feminist: the acceptance model 
requires legislators not only to treat like groups alike, but also to 
refrain from inscribing the imprimatur of "normalcy" upon male attri-
butes, characteristics, preferences, and modes of life. 
Other feminists, notably Catharine MacKinnon, Ruth Colker, and 
Mary Becker,G9 argue that the rationality model had a second and 
deeper problem that Littleton's reform, although well-meaning and 
even welcome, failed to address. The larger problem with the ration-
ality model is not just that women are different from men in ways 
which formal equality ignores, but that formal equality itself, whether 
or not modified by Littleton's "acceptance" amendment, targets the 
wrong evil.60 Irrationality, or treating like groups differently, should 
not be the target of the equal protection clause, nor should rationality, 
treating like groups alike, be regarded as its goal. Rather, antisubor-
dinationists argue that the social subordination of some groups by 
others (women by men and blacks by whites) is the target of the equal 
protection clause. Hence, only substantive equality between these 
groups, or the end of social subordination, is its goal. 61 The rationality 
model fails to target the social, economic, and political differences that 
account for women's subordinate status. A constitutional mandate that 
legislation must presume a sameness between men and women in the 
56. See Littleton, Reconstrncting Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987). 
57. [d. at 1296-97. 
58. [d. 
59. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 20; Becker, supra note 43; Colker, Antisubordination 
Above All Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986). 
60. See Colker, supra note 59, at 1007-16. 
61. [d. 
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face of massive inequality will be simply irrelevant to the true causes 
and nature of women's inequality or will backfire and harm rather 
than help women. Professor Becker explained the consequences of 
formal equality: 
Formal equality ... can effect only limited change. It cannot, 
for example, ensure that jobs are structured so that female 
workers and male workers are equally able to combine wage 
work and parenthood. Nor can it ensure that social security, 
unemployment compensation, and other safety nets are 
structured so as to provide for women's financial security as 
well as they provide for men's. Moreover, women, especially 
ordinary mothers and wives, have been harmed by the 
changes effected to date by the movement towards formal 
equality. Further movement in that direction could bring 
additional harm. Any other satisfactory and workable general 
standard to be applied by judges is as yet unimagined and 
likely to be so for the foreseeable future. 62 
C. Alternative Understandings of Equal Protection: 
Antisubordination and Pure Protection 
The critiques of the rationality model summarized above have given 
rise to a second, and dissident, understanding of the mandate of equal 
protection. Catharine MacKinnon has delineated this second under-
standing with great foree and eloquence in her writings.63 Often called 
the antisubordination model of equal protection, this view perceives 
the equality that equal protection guarantees as substantive, not for-
mal. Hence, the test of legislation under the equal protection clause 
is not whether the legislative classification "fits" a pre-existing reality, 
but rather whether the classification furthers the subordination of 
women vis-a.-vis men or attempts to end that subordination. MacKin-
non explained the antisubordination model: 
[The] only question for litigation is whether the policy or 
practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance 
of an underclass or a deprived position because of gender 
status. This disadvantage which constitutes the injury of 
discrimination is not the failure to be treated ''without regard 
to" one's sex; that is the injury of arbitrary differentiation. 
62. Becker, supra note 43, at 247. 
63. See generally c. MAcK1NNON, supra note 20, at 215-37 (development of antisubordina-
tion theory of equality). 
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The unfairness lies in being deprived because of being a. 
woman or a man, a deprivation given meaning in the social 
context of the dominance or preference of one sex over the 
other. 64 
61 
The antisubordination model, then, aspires not to formal equality, 
but to substantive equality. The goal is not a world in which state 
legislators treat men and women ''the same," but rather a world in 
which men and women, whether the same or different, are social 
equals. The antisubordination model envisions a world in which women 
are no more vulnerable to asault than men are, no less valued than 
men are, no more underpaid than men are, no less cared for than men 
are, no less represented than men are, and no less participatory in 
the public sphere than men are. In sharp contrast to the rationality 
model, the antisubordination model rests not on a universalist vision 
of our "shared" human nature, but on a political vision of our present 
unequal social reality.65 For constitutional purposes, the relevant issue 
is decidedly not that women are ''the same" as men but are treated 
differently or that women are different from men and are treated the 
same. The relevant issue is that women are subordinate to men in 
the public social, economic, private, and intimate spheres. Thus, the 
aim of the equal protection clause should be to highlight and rectify 
that political reality and not to highlight and mirror similarities or 
differences between men and women. Legislation that promotes or 
encourages social equality is constitutional, but that which promotes 
or encourages social subordination is unconstitutional. 66 
64. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 117 (1979). 
65. See generally C. MAcKINNON, supra note 20, at 215-37 (development of antisubordina-
tion theory of equality). 
66. The antisubordination model has much to commend it, not only to women's progress, 
but also as a constitutional rule. It is the essence of simplicity. Doctrine developed under this 
model would not bear the burdens of two-tiered review, suspect class analysis, the real difference 
doctrine, and the intent requirement. As Professor MacKinnon noted, ''the only question for liti-
gation" is whether the statute subordinates women, or challenges that subordination. C. MAe-
KINNON, supra note 64, at 117 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 64. 
The antisubordination model of equal protection, however, also is riddled with problems, many 
of them pragmatic. Most importantly, because of its simplicity, the antisubordination model 
could be extremely difficult to apply to particular cases: it is much easier to state the standard 
than to ascertain whether a particular piece oflegislation has met the standard. Feminist scholar 
and lawyer Sylvia Law explains: 
Professor MacKinnon's approach is ambitious, but it adds unnecessary complexity 
to the application of sex equality doctrine in a large number of cases. The determi-
nation of what reinforces or undermines a sex-based underclass is exceedingly 
difficult. Professor MacKinnon may overestimate judges' capacities to identify and 
avoid socially imposed constraints on equality. She disregards our history in which 
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A third possible und,:!rstanding of equal protection that has received 
relatively little attention in either feminist commentary or cases, but 
which may be closer to the plain meaning, intent, and history of the 
clause than either the rationality or the antisubordination models, is 
what I call the pure protection model. To deny equal protection might 
mean that a state refuses to grant to some citizens the protection 
against private wrongdoing that it grants to others. For example, a 
state's refusal to protect black citizens from homicidal attacks by 
whites or a state's passivity in the face of widespread lynching and 
private violence would constitute a paradigmatic violation of the con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. Similarly, as Jus-
tice Bradley suggested in The Civil Rights Cases,67 a southern state's 
refusal to grant a common law cause of action to black travelers to 
protect them against southern white innkeepers' refusals of service 
would constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. 68 
In this century, for northern as well as southern municipalities to 
provide less-than-adequate police protection against violent crime in 
poorer parts of a city might constitute a denial of the equal protection 
of the law under the pure protection model. Likewise, for a municipal-
ity to employ an all-white police force hostile to the concerns, fears, 
and interests of black neighborhoods might constitute an equal protec-
tion violation. Therefore, under the pure protection model, no less 
than under the antisubordination model, Washington v. Davis is clearly 
wrong. The pure protection model views the target of the equal pro-
tection clause as the denial of the state's protection to some of its 
citizens from private violence, aggression, and wrongdoing. The goal 
is a community in which all are equally protected by the state against 
private encroachment of rights. 
One way to describe the vision behind this pure protection model 
of equal protection, and to a lesser extent behind the antisubordination 
model, is in terms of state sovereignty. The pure protection model 
envisions a world in which the state is the sole, legitimate repositor 
laws justified as protecting women have been a central means of oppressing them. 
Most fundamentally, her proposed standard may incorporate and perpetuate a false 
belief that a judicially enforced constitutional standard can, by itself, dismantle the 
deep structures that "integrally contribute" to sex-based deprivation. 
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1005 (1984). 
Even accepting Professor Law's criticism, the major problem with the model is somewhat 
simpler: for whatever reasons, antisubordination approaches to equal protection, regarding sex 
or race, have not met with judicial acceptance. 
67. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
68. I d. at 25. 
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of organized force exercised by some individuals against others. The 
equal protection clause would not tolerate the existence of separate 
''regimes'' of sovereignty, backed by unchecked and private systems 
of organized violence. The pure protection model requires that we live 
under only one sovereign - the state. The white race cannot constitute 
a separate sphere of sovereignty over the black race, nor can men 
constitute a separate sovereignty over women. Only the state has the 
power to exercise dominion; through the use of organized violence, 
over its citizens. Any other exercise of violence and power by one 
group of citizens over another is criminal, and the state is constitution-
ally obligated to guard its citizens against such domination. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION 
Predictably, most of the scholarly commentary and virtually all of 
the judicial opinions that have addressed the constitutionality of mar-
ital rape exemptions have analyzed the constitutionality of marital 
rape exemptions under the rationality model of equality and equal 
protection.69 The commentary and opinions illustrate not only the 
strength and sensibility of the rationality model, but also the problems 
and limits of its formal vision of equality, its universalist vision of 
human nature, and its doctrinal tests of ''rationality.'' These arguments 
take several different forms, depending on whether the law under 
scrutiny is gender-specific (exempts wives from rape laws) or gender-
neutral (exempts "spouses"). A summary of these arguments follows. 
First, some states employ marital rape exemptions that are 
explicitly gendered: rape is defined as nonconsensual intercourse with 
a woman other than one's wife.70 The two-step argument that these 
gender-specific statutes are unconstitutional is straightforward. First, 
such gender-specific statutes explicitly legislate on the basis of either 
gender alone or gender plus marital status. Either classification con-
stitutes a suspect class giving rise to at least the mid-level scrutiny. 71 
As the Court has noted on multiple occasions, women have been the 
objects of stereotypical and stultifying thinking that has seriously com-
promised their enjoyment of and participation in the public world.72 
69. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
70. See generally Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 2, at 1259-60, 1267-70 (discussing 
gender-based marital rape exemption statutes and citing states that currently have such statutes 
in force). 
71. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
72. See S1.tpra note 37. 
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For that reason alone, legislation that treats women differently from 
men deserves heightened scrutiny.73 Furthermore, although the Court 
never has held as much, historically oppressive treatment renders 
married women a suspect class. In American and English common 
law heritage, the law did not acknowledge a married woman's exis-
tence. 74 Thus, a law that burdens either women or married women, 
and marital rape exemptions can do both, should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny. 
Second, under a heightened scrutiny, if the gender-specific legisla-
tion is to be sustained., the state must articulate an "important gov-
ernmental interest" which is "substantially related" to the statutory 
classification.75 This articulation, the argument proceeds, a state cannot 
possibly do. Proponents of the marital rape exemption typically assert 
that the state's important interest in promoting marital harmony and 
intimacy, or, alternatively, its interest in encouraging reconciliation 
of warring spouses, justifies the statute.76 Yet, the state undeniably 
has little or no legitimate interest in protecting the harmony or inti-
macy of a marriage deteriorated to the point of violent sexual abuse, 
and it has equally as little interest in encouraging the reconciliation 
of spouses whose relations no longer are consensual, much less har-
monious. 77 Thus, because these statutory classifications are not "sub-
stantially related" to an important governmental interest, gender-spe-
cific marital exemption laws are unconstitutional. 
On the other hand, marital exemptions that define rape as noncon-
sensual sex with anyone except one's spouse, rather than nonconsen-
sual sex with anyone except one's wife, are gender neutral. While 
these statutes avoid the heightened scrutiny triggered by gender-
explicit classifications, they nevertheless also are unconstitutional 
under traditional rationality standards. A gender-neutral classification 
that adversely impacts upon women and appears to be motivated by 
an intention to hurt women is as unconstitutional as is a sex-specific 
classification.78 Marital rape exemptions are strikingly easy to trace 
to misogynist roots, from Hale's infamous argument that a married 
woman is presumed to consent to all marital sex and, therefore, cannot 
73. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). 
74. See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 2, at 1256-58. 
75. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
76. See supra note 13 lmd accompanying text. 
77. See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567,573,485 N.Y.S.2d 207,213 (1984). 
78. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (discussing neutral classifications 
and adverse impacts in a Title VII racial discrimination context). 
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be raped,79 to the common law's assumption that marriage results in 
the unification of husband and wife and that marital rape thus consti-
tutes rape of oneself, a legal impossibility. so Whether cleansed through 
the filter of sex-neutral language or not, the marital rape exemption 
clearly is rooted in an intention to deprive the married woman of the 
protection of the state and to subject her to the will, sovereignty, and 
unchecked violence of her spouse. Because this intention serves no 
''important governmental interest," gender-neutral marital rape 
exemptions are unconstitutional as well. 
Furthermore, whether gender-specific or gender-neutral, marital 
rape exemptions create. a host of irrational distinctions that underscore 
their unconstitutionality: between married couples and unmarried 
couples who cohabitate; between married, but estranged partners still 
living together and married partners living apart (who often are not 
included in the scope of the exemption); between partners who have 
filed for divorce and those who have not; and between partners who 
have indicated their intentions to end the marital union and those who 
have not.81 Apart from the effects of the marital rape exemption on 
women, and even granting the importance of the state's interest in 
protecting marital harmony, these distinctions are irrational. What 
rational, legitimate state goal could possibly justify the lines drawn 
between these groups? 
Paradoxically, perhaps the strongest traditional, rationality-based 
argument against marital rape exemptions has not appeared in case 
law. This argument asserts that these statutes create an irrational 
distinction between married women and all other persons and that 
this distinction is not justified by real differences between those two 
groups. The classification and differential treatment of married women 
rests on the assumption that married women, unlike all other persons, 
have no interest in receiving protection from the state against violent 
and sexual assault. But, married women, exactly like men and unmar-
ried women, clearly need physical security in their private spheres. 
Just as all human beings without the security and dignity of knowing 
that the state ensures their protection, women cannot lead autonom-
ous, meaningful, and pleasurable lives. Married women need to know 
that sexual assault against them is criminal and punishable when com-
mitted by their husbands. For that matter, they need to know that 
sexual assault is as criminal when committed against them as would 
79. M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACTORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 636 (1736). 
so. For a good discussion of the history of the exemption, see Note, To Have and To Hold, 
supra note 2, at 1255-58. 
81. [d. at 1259-60. 
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be any intrafamilial crime of violence. The irrational distinction of the 
marital rape exemption is between the protected needs and rights of 
the average citizen to be safe from criminal assault and the unprotected 
same needs and rights of married women. The creation of a class of 
citizens subject to legalized violence is the core effect, if not the pur-
pose, of the marital rape exemption. Surely, the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal protection must guard against that effect. 
Marital rape exemptions, then, are arguably unconstitutional, even 
under the traditional rationality model of equal protection, for reasons 
that are at the heart of that model's utopian vision. We do indeed 
share a common humanity, part of which is to need protection against 
private violence. Women are as much in need of that protection as 
are men. Like men, without that protection women are rendered vul-
nerable to the whim, will, sovereignty, instincts, fiat, and command 
of those who are stronger. And, like men, when women are rendered 
weak, they become incapable of living the kinds of lives the ideal 
liberal state is surely meant to foster: autonomous, pleasurable, pro-
ductive, civic, and educated. When state passivity renders women 
vulnerable to private violence, women, like men, become stunted, 
fearful, self-alienated, childlike, and servile. Women are no more natur-
ally suited to such servility and dominance than are their brothers, 
fathers, sons, and husbands. 
All of these arguments, however, pose serious doctrinal problems. 
These problems reflect the inadequacies of the rationality model of 
equal protection and formal equality that have troubled feminists 
throughout the 1980s. Simply stated, for each argument catalogued 
above, a fairly obvious legal rejoinder is available, which is equally, 
if not better, grounded in modern equal protection doctrine. I am not 
using a linguistic quirk or playing a lawyer's game. My point is not 
the familiar indeterminacy claim that any legal argument gives rise 
to an equally credible rejoinder. Rather, the doctrinal and legal bases 
for the legal rejoinders rest on the fundamental, political reality of 
women's lives - the irreducible fact of women's subordination to men 
through unchecked sexual violence. The universalist vision and formal 
equality aspirations of the rationality model of equal protection simply 
fail to address this reality. Thus, the very existence and viability of 
these rejoinders evidence the limits and dangers of current understand-
ings of the equal protection clause. 
First, the argument for the unconstitutionality of gender-specific 
rape exemptions summarized above is anything but airtight. As noted 
earlier, in contrast to the impossible requirement of a compelling state 
interest required to sustain racially explicit legislation,82 gender-spe-
82. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34. 
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cific legislation is constitutional if the state can articulate an ''important 
governmental objective" substantially furthered by the gendered class-
ification.83 Nothing prohibits a court from determining that protection 
of marital privacy, insularity, and harmony is such an important state 
interest that protection of the husband against criminal charges of 
rape substantially furthers that interest.84 The political reality that 
the availability of this legal rejoinder reflects is that, to the 
mainstream, the very sphere of private subordination that harms 
women and concerns feminists appears to be not only a legitimate, 
but also an important or even compelling state interest. This political 
reality also reflects a deeper social reality. The obstacles to women's 
equal participation in public life and enjoyment of private life are so 
thoroughly ingrained in our societal habits, institutions, and thought 
patterns that they appear not as obstacles to equality, but as the 
essence of private life. Surely, protecting the allure of romance, the 
domain of sentiment, and the pleasures of intimacy is a compelling 
state interest. The bottom line is that the same reality experienced 
by the raped wife as a daily ritual of violence, abuse, and horror 
strikes the feminist as unconscionable state passivity in the face of 
private subordination and strikes the feminist lawyer as the denial of 
equal protection. But it conceivably appears to the Court as a ''impor-
tant" or "compelling" state interest in marital privacy, marital har-
mony, and spousal reconciliation. 
The argument for the unconstitutionality of gender-neutral marital 
rape exemptions also rests on shaky ground.85 The legal uncertainty 
reflects not the uncertainty or indeterminacy of legal arguments gen-
erally, but rather societal ambivalence towards women's equality. Gen-
der-neutral marital rape exemptions undoubtedly are the product of 
a history of discriminatory attitudes toward women.86 Nevertheless, 
a court conceivably could decide that, ancient history notwithstanding, 
a statute recently cleansed of gender-specific language is freed of its 
misogynist heritage and that its recent legislative history provides 
the sole source of its constitutionality. Surely one could argue that 
gender-neutral marital rape exemptions, similar to the one in the 
83. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
84. Indeed, the ''privacy'' cases under the substantive due process doctrine, including Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), itself, seems to bolster such an argument. See generally Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); 'Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
85. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
86. See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 2, at 1267. 
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Model Penal Code87 endorsed in this decade, rest not on a desire to 
harm women, but on a desire to protect the institution of marriage. 
As is evidenced by this theory, the presumption that the gender-
neutral marital rape exemptions are constitutional because they re-
spect the sameness of men and women ignores the very real differences 
between husbands and wives. Women and men are very differently 
situated within marriage. Overwhelmingly, husbands are larger, 
stronger, and wealthier than wives. A gender-neutral statute that 
treats spouses similarly by according them the same immunities from 
rape prosecution and hence the same vulnerability to marital rape 
ignores these crucial differences and perpetuates the marital subordi-
nation of women. As m~my feminists suggest, in the light of the societal 
differences between women and men, the presumption of fairness and 
constitutionality on universalist grounds typically accorded gender-
neutral statutes may be generally unwarranted.88 In the case of marital 
rape exemptions, however, the presumption of sameness in the face 
of life-threatening differences looks not only unwarranted but also 
grotesque. 
Most importantly, the arguable constitutionality of all marital rape 
exemptions, both gender-specific and gender-neutral, vividly 
exemplifies the antisubordinationist reservations about the rationality 
model of equal protection. The rationality arguments that underlie 
traditional equal protection analysis not only are doctrinally unstable, 
they also overlook the terrifying injustice of these statutes - for 
precisely the reasons MacKinnon's, Becker's, and Colker's critiques 
of formal equality suggest. Indeed, the virtue of rationality and the 
vice of irrationality is worse than irrelevant to the real injustice of 
these exemptions. After all, rationality problems with these statutes 
can and sometimes have been cured by extending rather than eliminat-
ing the scope of the exception. If married couples and cohabitants 
cannot rationally be treated differently, the marital rape exemption 
should be extended to include cohabitants.89 By the same perverse 
logic, if married womem and unmarried women cannot rationally be 
treated differently, rape law should be eliminated altogether. At the 
extreme, if married women and all other persons cannot rationally be 
treated differently, the criminal sanction should be eliminated. Pre-
sumably, these arguments would and should fail, but a model of equal 
protection that implies their coherence is profoundly wrong. 
87. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.0, .6 (1989). 
88. See supra notes 43-64 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra note 11. 
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The irrationality of marital rape exemptions is not their fundamen-
tal flaw. The evil flaw of these exemptions is not that they irrationally 
treat married couples differently from cohabitants, or married women 
differently from unmarried women, or husbands differently from 
rapists unacquainted with their victims, or women differently from 
men. The evil is that they legalize, and hence legitimate, a form of 
violence that does inestimable damage to all women, not only to those 
who are raped. In addition to the obvious violence, brutality, and 
terror marital rape exemptions facilitate, marital rape exemptions, 
like the rapes they legalize, also sever the central connection to self-
hood that links a woman's pleasure with her desires, will, and actions. 90 
The will of the married woman who learns to accept routinized rape 
is no longer ruled by or even connected to her desires. Eventually, 
her desires are no longer a product of what she enjoys or what she 
has learned to enjoy. What the victim of routinized rape within mar-
riage does, sexually, is a product not of what the victim wills but of 
what her attacker demands. As an immediate consequence, her will 
becomes a function not of her desires but of his desires. Eventually 
her desires become a function not of her pleasures, but of his pleasures; 
she wants literally to please him rather than herself because to please 
herself is too dangerous. The victim of marital rape gains survival, 
but she sacrifices self-sovereignty. In other words, she sacrifices the 
ability to control her own will and to determine her own actions, 
pleasures, and desires free from external influence. In short, she sac-
rifices selthood.91 
To call the damage occasioned by statutes protecting this direct 
subordination of self to the necessity of survival an irrationality simply 
is wrong. The damage occasioned by these statutes is the subordina-
tion, and in many cases the annihilation, of the psychic, physical, 
emotional, and erotic female self. Under a rationality model this clear 
fact entirely escapes constitutional notice. The exemption is constitu-
tional if rational and unconstitutional if irrational. Surely, the state 
acts irrationally when it complies with this profoundly personal, violent 
subordination. The determination of rationality depends on the Court's 
assessment of the importance of the state's goals. If the state wants 
to pursue the goal of marital privacy, harmony, and spousal reconcili-
ation at the cost of female self-sovereignty, and if the Court decides 
that the goal of marital privacy is important (which surely it could), 
90. See generally D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1983) (describing effects of marital 
rape exemptions); West, supra note 44. 
91. See generally West, supra note 44. 
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then the marital rape exemption is an imminently rational, hence con-
stitutional, way to achieve this goal. But, whether the law is rational 
or irrational, the state's complicity in this pervasive regime of private 
domestic violence is clearly unequal. It denies married women, in the 
most literal sense, the protection of its laws. The rationality model of 
equal protection quite dramatically fails to target the state's complicity 
in this subordinating annihilation of married women's selfuood. 
In contrast, both the evil and the inequality perpetuated by marital 
rape exemptions become strikingly apparent under either the dissident 
antisubordination or historical pure protection model of equal protec-
tion. Under the antisubordination model a state action violates the 
fourteenth amendment guarantee if the state complies with the subor-
dination of women by men.92 Without question, marital rape exemp-
tions do precisely that. The antisubordination model locates the target 
of the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantee, not in the 
irrationality of a state's legislative scheme, but in a state's complicity 
in private or social subordination. When the state encourages or per-
mits a significant increase in the illegitimate power of one social group 
over another, the state defies the safeguards of the equal protection 
clause. The marital rape exemption is an instance of state complicity 
in men's subordination of women through routinized violent sexual 
assault and the threat of violent assault. Each assault spurs self-denial, 
self-abnegation, and self-diminution for women and furthers political 
ratification of women's psychological and psychic subservience. Each 
assault constitutes a political act of subordination. Under the antisub-
ordination model even 8tate complicity, not to mention explicit state 
endorsement, in this private subordination clearly is unconstitutional. 
Similarly, the pure protection model highlights the unconstitution-
ality of these statutes rather than obscures it. This model recognizes 
that the fourteenth amendment ensures that all citizens equally enjoy 
the basic terms of the social contract, that the state protects all from 
private assault, that the state protects all from their own vulnerability, 
that the state recognizes the equality of all citizens under law, and 
that the state assures that they live under no separate sovereign 
authority.93 Only with such protection may persons construct the pub-
lic, productive, responsible, autonomous lives that the liberal state 
and its rule of law ideal envisions. A marital rape exemption, regard-
less of its intent, its history, or its purported state purpose, creates 
92. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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precisely the insulated, separate sphere of sovereignty that the pure 
protection view of the equal protection clause forbids. With the exemp-
tion in place, a marriage becomes not a nurturant, safe haven offering 
shelter from the storm, but a separate political world in which the 
husband is sovereign and the wife subject. Moreover, her vulnerability 
to this organized, dehumanizing, and alienating violence is fully legiti-
mated by the state under which she lives. Sexual force and violence 
within marriage is unleashed and legalized, and legalized force and 
violence, of course, is the precondition of political power. A marriage 
thus becomes a separate state of sovereignty. The marital rape exemp-
tion creates, fosters, and encourages not marital intimacy, harmony, 
or reconciliation, but a separate state of sovereignty ungoverned by 
law and insulated from state interference. Whatever other "legitimate" 
goals the state may thereby further, such a separate political order, 
under a pure protection model, precisely is what the fourteenth amend-
ment forbids the states to tolerate. 
IV. RATIONALITY, ANTISUBORDINATION, AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION: 
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In summary, equal protection lends itself to three different in-
terpretations: (1) a rationality model, which targets legislative classifi-
cations that are irrational or irrelevant to legitimate state goals; (2) 
an antisubordination model, which targets legislation that substan-
tively contributes to the subordination of one group by another, and 
(3) a pure protection model, which targets a state's failure to grant 
protection of its law to all citizens equally, thus failing to ensure that 
all citizens are subject equally to one and only one sovereign, namely 
the sovereignty of the rule of law. Marital rape exemptions are uncon-
stitutional under all of these approaches. However, the argument for 
that conclusion under the rationality model is weak, and it obscures, 
rather than highlights, the most unjust features of marital rape exemp-
tions. The antisubordination and pure protection interpretations of the 
equal protection clause, by contrast, precisely highlight the most offen-
sive features of marital rape exemptions - not the irrationality of 
marital rape exemptions, but their legitimation of a regime of private 
force and organized violence that creates and encourages the male 
subordination of women and the insulation of a separate and sovereign 
political regime through which that subordination is effectuated. 
These three models, however, do not stand on equal footing. The 
rationality model, which has without question been a mixed blessing 
for women, is dominant black letter law in the area of gender classifi-
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cations, and the Court does not seem inclined to change that fact. 94 
The antisubordination model of equal protection, although arguably 
closer to the Warren Court's understanding of the phrase,95 has played 
virtually no role in the development of equal protection doctrine over 
the last twenty years and only an ambiguous role during the prior 
twenty years. The pure protection model has not influenced equal 
protection doctrine for over one hundred years. Its last judicial 
acknowledgement may have been in Justice Bradley's decision in 1883 
in The Civil Rights Cases. 96 Consequently, both the antisubordination 
model and the pure protection model are only of limited utility. The 
antisubordination model aids in understanding the ambiguities and 
tensions in the discrimination law of the 1950s and 1960s, when it 
commanded some respect from the Warren COurt.97 The pure protec-
tion model provides some insight concerning the original intent of the 
framers of the equal protection clause. For modern purposes, however, 
these models clearly are dissident interpretive views. They represent 
what the Court could, but does not, read the equal protection clause 
to require. 
Two questions arise. First, why has the modern Court accepted a 
rationality model of equal protection and rejected the other two alter-
natives? Second, assuming continuing judicial recalcitrance, can the 
alternative interpretations of the clause prevail? The answer to the 
first question may be that the Court may have accepted the rationality 
model of equal protection because only that model creates the stand-
ard, legalistic issues that courts are well suited and accustomed to 
answering on a practical, jurisprudential level. If this assertion is 
correct, then the second question answers itself. However, if the Court 
has settled on a rationality model simply because it facilitates judicial 
analysis, then other branches of government, notably Congress, may 
be open themselves to antisubordination and pure protection interpre-
tations of their fourteenth amendment obligations. 
94. For the Court's most recent affirmation of its adherence to a rationality model, and 
rejection of an antisubordination model, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989). 
95. For a general discussion of the transformation in American constitutional law from a 
"liberal legalist" to a conservative paradigm, see West, Progressive and Conservative Con-
stitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990). 
96. See 109 U.S. at 25. 
97. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 489 (1954). For a general argument to 
the effect that Brown and its progeny should best be understood as within an antisubordination 
framework, see Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
935 (1989). 
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In determining the Court's reason for accepting the rationality 
model, remember that the Court itself typically insists, in the course 
of rejecting antisubordinationist arguments, that its reasons for doing 
so are in large part pragmatic. For example, in Washington v. Davis, 
the most unequivocal rejection of the antisubordinationist model, the 
Court noted that adoption of such an interpretation of equal protection 
would invalidate a wide range of regulatory, social, and economic 
legislation that affects the average black more than it affects the 
average white.98 And so it would. By so ruling, the Court clearly 
implied that, rightly or wrongly, it is unwilling to undertake such an 
intrusive restructuring of federal and state law. This unwillingness 
stems not from legal or moral principles, but from pragmatism. The 
Court itself insists that it simply cannot fulfill the antisubordinationist 
mandate, given its judicial identity. 
Jurisprudential reasons may draw the Court to a rationality model 
of equal protection analysis. The rationality model requires state legis-
lators and lawmakers to ''treat like groups alike" and requires Courts 
to see that they do so. Any legislative classification, then, must be 
based upon a difference between the groups that is relevant to a 
legitimate state interest.99 The Court's responsibility under the equal 
protection clause is to police against legislative infringement of this 
principle. Feminist and progressive antisubordinationist theorists, 
however, have identified a major defect in this interpretation: it does 
not challenge or change socially created inequalities between classes, 
genders, or races.1OO Despite this flaw, the model has an important 
virtue from a judicial perspective: it limits the Court's role to the 
familiar ·one of ensuring legal justice. To do justice, a Court must 
treat like cases alike. For the most part, appellate courts, including 
the Supreme Court, simply police against lower court infractions of 
this principle. The rationality model simply imposes an equivalent duty 
on legislators. Thus, while judges must treat like cases alike, legis-
lators, who deal with groups instead of cases, also must treat like 
groups alike. The Court's duty under the equal protection clause, then, 
is to ensure that the legislature metes out equal justice to the groups 
before it, just as the Court's appellate function is to ensure that lower 
courts mete out equal justice to the individuals who appear before 
them. The rationality model of equal protection may be the only model 
98. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-48 (1976). 
99. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. 
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that so neatly dovetails with the most traditional, and even classical, 
view of judicial functions and domain. WI 
By construing the equal protection clause as a source of "law" to 
be applied by Courts, the general legal culture may have to a consid-
erable degree determined its meaning, not only because we have ren-
dered it subject to the Court's own sense of the pragmatic limits of 
its powers, but also because of the nature of law. As long as courts 
interpret and enforce the equal protection clause, it should not be 
surprising that they interpret the clause as requiring "legal justice," 
or like groups must be treated alike, rather than distributive or even 
compensatory justice. There is no reason to think that the Supreme 
Court is not fully corrfident of its ability to oversee the quality of 
formal, legal justice dispensed by lower courts: that is the Court's 
traditional, appellate function. The rationality model of the fourteenth 
amendment extends the obligation of doing legal justice to legislators, 
but it makes absolutely no fundamental change in the Court's social 
role. In this area as in any other, the Court continues to oversee the 
quality of legal justice meted out by other institutional and governmen-
tal bodies. Consequently, the ultimate judicial embrace of the ration-
ality model, including the formal understanding of the requirement of 
legal justice, the antidiscrimination principle, the intent requirement, 
the two-tiered or three-tiered levels of review, and the ''real differ-
ences" rule in the gender cases, may have been inevitable, regardless 
of the political compos:ition of the Court. The Court simply may be 
unable and unwilling to sustain, for any length of time, any reading 
of equal protection that would be less legalistic and more substantive. 
The appropriate question to ask, then, may be not whether the 
Court will adopt a more aggressive stance toward equal protection, 
but whether nonjudicial enforcement of alternative meanings of the 
equal protection clause is possible. The answer we give to that question 
depends in large part upon whether we view the Court as the exclu-
101. The subsidiary rules the Court has developed under the rationality model likewise can 
be understood as ensuring that equal protection law is rendered susceptible to the most tradi-
tional, legalistic, and even classical understandings of the requirements of justice. The intent 
requirement for race-neutral and gender-neutral classifications adversely impacting upon the 
suspect class most notably has the effect not only of restraining severely the reach of the equal 
protection clause, but also of limiting the court to traditional forms of analysis. Intent require-
ments run throughout the law, including tort, contract, and criminal law. The intent requirement 
in adverse impact cases under the fourteenth amendment has the effect of transforming constitu-
tional questions into the most traditional, as well as narrowest, legal inquiry imaginable: who 
is guilty of wrong doing, with what mens rea, who was thereby hurt, and by how much? 
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sive, as well as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.102 That 
is, a connection may exist between a pluralistic approach to constitu-
tional meaning and a pluralistic approach to constitutional obligations. 
Let me first explain these admittedly awkward labels. 
Under a pluralistic rather than unitary conception of constitutional 
meanings, a constitutional mandate might have several obligatory 
meanings. Under a pluralistic approach to constitutional meaning, the 
equal protection clause might require (1) that legislative classifications 
treat like groups alike; (2) that legislation not insulate or further the 
social subordination of women, blacks, or other suspect classes; and 
(3) that states ensure that all citizens enjoy the protection of its laws 
against private wrongdoing. In contrast, under a unitary approach a 
constitutional phrase will have only one obligatory meaning. While 
equal protection might logically mean a range of things, and while its 
meaning might change over time, only one meaning at any particular 
time will be binding law. To put the question formally, then, the issue 
is why have we embraced a unitary approach to constitutional meaning 
that has rendered antisubordinationist and pure protection understand-
ings of equality dead letters 
One reason may be that if the Court is the exclusive and ultimate 
interpreter of constitutional meaning, connotative pluralism is awk-
ward, to say the least. Under a unitary approach to institutional ob-
ligation, which identifies the Court as the branch of government obli-
gated to enforce it, the Constitution means that which the Court says 
it means and only that which the Court says it means. A unitary 
approach to meaning follows practically, if not logically, from a unitary 
approach to obligation. If, on the other hand, we expand our conception 
of who and what is obligated to ensure equal protection under the 
fourteenth amendment, then pluralistic conceptions of equal protection 
meaning begin to look plausible. The Court could continue to ensure 
that legislation treat like groups alike. However, Congress could en-
sure that state laws prohibit subordination. Lastly, the executive 
branch and Congress jointly could ensure that the state supply the 
fundamental benefits and burdens of the social contract to all citizens 
equally. The state would provide security against private violence and 
wrongdoing in exchange for abidance with the obligations of citizenry 
under a rule of law regime. 
102. There is no doubt, of course, that the Court is the ultimate interpreter of constitutional 
meaning. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (reaffirming that the judiciary is the 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution). 
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If we change our constitutional habits and learn to think pluralis-
tically about not only the potential meanings of the fourteenth amend-
ment, but also the potential obligations the amendment imparts on all 
three branches of government, then we might recognize a wide range 
of governmental actions as instances of constitutional decisionmak-
ing. 103 More importantly, though, if we think pluralistically not just 
about possible meanings, but also about possible sources of enforce-
ment, an expansive understanding of the equality guaranteed under 
the fourteenth amendment might one day become a social reality. 
v. A PROPOSE:D MARRIED WOMEN'S PRIVACY ACT 
Whether or not the United States Supreme Court or state supreme 
courts ever rule on the unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions, 
Congress has the power, the authority, and arguably the duty, to do 
so, under section five of the fourteenth amendment. 104 Congress could 
enact a federal law guaranteeing protection to all women against vio-
lent sexual assault. Consistent with rationality requirements, this law 
would prohibit irrational discrimination against married women in the 
making and enforcement of rape laws. This federal law also would 
guarantee, consistent with the antisubordination mandate of the four-
teenth amendment, tha,t states would not perpetuate or insulate the 
sexualized social, private, or intimate subordination of women by men. 
Lastly, consistent with the "protection" mandate of the fourteenth 
amendment, it would guarantee that no state would deny to women 
protection of the state against private criminality. The political will 
mayor may not be sufficient to sustain such a bill, but the constitu-
tional authority for it surely exists. 
A law of this sort at least would remove the anomaly that, while 
the marital rape exemptions strike most concerned lawyers and legal 
academicians as spectacularly unconstitutional, under present doctrine, 
no clear-cut argument presents itself. Perhaps the main reason for 
this lag between consensus, argument, and action is logistic. Given a 
court-based system of constitutional adjudication in which courts have 
near exclusive responsibility for interpreting and enforcing constitu-
103. Robert Kennedy's decision to send in the National Guard during the desegregation 
campaigns in the South, for example, appears to be a paradigm instance of protection-type 
executive enforcement of the equal protection guarantee. 
104. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 
(1966) (section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing 
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation to secure 
fourteenth amendment guarantees). 
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tionallaw, cases that properly raise issues of this sort will be extremely" 
rare. Thus, when a rape defendant raises the issue of the unconstitu-
tionality of the marital rape exemption - indeed, to the best of my 
lmowledge, the only scenario to date in which the issue has been 
raised - he is likely to be arguing that the state's refusal to extend 
the exemption to him, is an unconstitutional denial of his equal protec-
tion rights. lOS A court could respond to this sort of argument by striking 
the exemption in its entirety. lOG However, a court faced with this 
argument could avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the exemption 
by simply rejecting the contention that the failure of the state to 
extend the exemption constitutes a denial of equal protection. A suit 
for damages under the Civil Rights Act or directly under the four-
teenth amendment, the other major vehicles for bringing a constitu-
tional infirmity to a court's attention, also lacks logistical viability. A 
court hardly could find any branch or agent of state government liable 
for failing to arrest or prosecute when no state statute criminalizing 
the conduct exists. State immunity doctrines, of course, would bar an 
action against the legislature for failing to criminalize conduct. For 
logistic reasons alone, the issue seems ripe for legislative, rather than 
judicial, constitutional decisionmaking. 
The second reason for urging a congressional rather than judicial 
response to the unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions lies in 
the fact that Congress may be more willing than the judiciary to 
interpret seriously the fourteenth amendment as forbidding marital 
rape exemptions. Congress is more likely to view marital rape exemp-
tions as subordinating women and insulating a separate sovereignty 
of legitimized force, thereby denying women's rights to equal protec-
tion under law. Congress may be more open to these arguments not 
only because of its present political composition, but for institutional 
and theoretical reasons as well. Unlike the Court, Congress is not 
obligated to ensure that legislation rationally map on to pre-existing 
real distinctions. Furthermore, at least on occasion, Congress aggres-
sively has sought to dismantle and restructure the social, private, and 
even intimate structures that collectively create and mask the hierar-
chies of daily life. Unlike the Court, Congress does not recoil inevitably 
at the prospect of undertaking significant reconstructions of social life. 
Indeed, this duty is clearly its business. The fourteenth amendment 
105. See supra note 1. 
106. The New York Court of Appeals, to its credit, has struck the marital rape exemption 
on this ground. See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207,219-20 
(1984). 
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easily can be read as a constitutional norm that directs, guides, and 
legitimizes the political and moral direction those reconstructive efforts 
should take. 
If we think of the fourteenth amendment as a moral and political 
guide for reconstructive legislation aimed at eradicating illegitimate 
social subordination and private spheres of insulated, violent 
sovereignty, marital rape exemptions surely are a sensible place for 
Congress to start to fulfill its constitutional obligations. A dismantling 
of the private regime of sexual violence against women could affect 
socially women's public and private lives as greatly as the dismantling 
of private regimes of segregation and institutionalized racism has af-
fected blacks. As was the case with the desegregation campaign, the 
legal recognition of a constitutional right to protection against private 
sexual violence in the domestic sphere, without more, could change 
and expand not only women's rights, privacy, security, and safety, 
but also women's senses of self and others' senses of women as fully 
participatory, represented, acknowledged, and respected members of 
society. Such recognition could help rehabilitate the damage to 
women's self-esteem, their feelings of self-possession, and their overall 
sense of wholeness. Just as the constitutional assault on desegregation 
triggered a change in societal perception of blacks, constitutionally 
motivated congressional action ensuring women's rights to be pro-
tected against marital rape could trigger wide ranging changes in 
societal portrayals and perceptions of women's roles, rights, and public 
responsibilities. 
Finally, the foundational and permanent recognition of women's 
rights to be free from forced marital sex that can come about only 
through constitutional decisionmaking may be a prerequisite to further 
progress on a range of related issues regarding women's physical and 
sexual security. Date ra.pe and acquaintance rape, for example, unlike 
marital rape, clearly are criminal, but they may be insulated from 
legal prosecution and public condemnation at least in part because of 
their shadow resemblance to marital rape, which is still fully protected 
in many states and underprosecuted in virtually all. The martial 
exemption, in brief, is simply the most brutal of all possible expressions 
of the social inclination to trivialize women's interest in physical and 
sexual security. Until women have physical and sexual security, both 
their public contributions and their private lives will be stunted, not 
only by personal fears, but by social and legal inferiority fueled by a 
public perception of female personhood perverted by the deep knowl-
edge of women's legal vulnerability. Women will not have that security 
until they have established their constitutional right to be equally 
protected against laws that encourage their psychic and sexual sub or-
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dination and render them subject to private states of separate 
sovereignty. Conversely, when the law guarantees women that secu-
rity, the gains will be immense. All women, married and single, and 
all men might learn what it means to live in a truly democratic home, 
in a truly nurturant social world, transformed and inspired by a newly 
empowered, equally respected feminist community. 
